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The Impact of Defining "Beneficial
Use" Upon Nebraska Water
Appropriation Law
L.B. 149, 85th Leg., 1st Sess. (1977).
I. INTRODUCTION
Legislative Bill 149,1 which would define the types of beneficial
uses for which Nebraska stream water may be appropriated, is at
the same time modest and ambitious. It is modest in that it is brief:
As used in Chapter 46, article 2, Reissue Revised Statutes of
Nebraska, 1943, and amendments thereto, beneficial use shall mean
the use of water for domestic, livestock, municipal, irrigation,
manufacturing, power, recreation, fish and wildlife, ground water
recharge and storage, waste assimilation, navigation, and any other
purpose having public value.2
The bill is also modest in that it provides no scheme of preferences
as among the categories of beneficial uses,3 and is mainly intended
to merely focus legislative discussion on the uses to which remain-
ing unappropriated Nebraska stream water should be put.4 It is
ambitious because it specifically recognizes as beneficial uses several
uses heretofore unrecognized in Nebraska statute and case law, and
generally recognizes "any other purpose having public value." 5 It
may also be ambitious in that its proposed recognition of such uses
1. L.B. 149, 85th Leg., 1st Sess. (1977). The bill was introduced by Sen-
ator Donald Dworak, 22nd legislative district. At the end of the ses-
sion, L.B. 149 had not been advanced out of the Committee on Public
Works. Worksheet, 85th Leg., 1st Sess. (June 7, 1977).
2. L.B. 149, 85th Leg., 1st Sess. (1977).
3. "It is not, and I cannot make this too clear, it is not an attempt to
prioritize uses of water. In no way do I attempt to prioritize uses
of water." Hearing on L.B. 149 Before the Comm. on Public Works,
85th Leg., 1st Sess. 31 (1977) (statement of Senator Donald Dworak).
See note 10 infra, distinguishing uses of derivations of "priority."
4. "L.B. 149 is a very sincere and a very honest attempt to define and
expand beneficial uses of water." Id.
5. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
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as fish and wildlife, recreation, and navigation at least raises the
possibility of in-stream appropriation of water.,
These latter ambitions, even though avoiding the controversial
matter of preference-listing the competing uses of water, suggest
that, should L.B. 149 be taken up in the 85th Legislature's second
session or be reintroduced in a subsequent legislature, the bill may
be the subject of some debate.
II. THE BENEFICIAL USE CONCEPT IN NEBRASKA
The adoption in 1920 of a series of state constitutional sections
is the bedrock of the beneficial use concept in Nebraska water law.
The constitution declares the necessity of water for domestic and
irrigation purposes a "natural want,"7 dedicates the use of the water
of natural streams to the people "for beneficial purposes," and
limits that dedication in certain ways. 9 Except when public inter-
est otherwise requires, the right to divert unappropriated waters
of streams "for beneficial use" is not to be denied a citizen.' 0 Stated
positively, appropriation is possible when the appropriator puts the
water to a beneficial use. Although the constitution does not define
"beneficial use," its sections recognize four uses of water:" domes-
tic, agricultural, manufacturing,1 2 and power generation.
1 3
Nebraska statutes track the constitutional provisions and des-
ignate the State Department of Water Resources (DWR) as the
agency which determines appropriation priorities. 14 In delegating
6. See notes 26-36 and accompanying text infra.
7. NEB. CONsT. art. XV, § 4.
8. NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 5.
9. NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 6.
10. Id. Section 6 also sets forth the first-in-time, first-in-right doctrine
of prior appropriation common to arid and semi-arid western states:
"Priority of appropriation shall give the better right as between those
using the water for the same purpose . . . ." Under this doctrine,
"priority" refers to time and is to be distinguished from references in
the hearing on L.B. 149 to "prioritizing" uses of water. As used in
the hearing, "priority" apparently was used as synonymous with "pre-
ference." See note 3 supra.
11. NEB. CONsT. art. XV, §§ 6-7. There is no constitutional language to
suggest the specification of the four uses was intended to prohibit re-
cognition of other uses of water.
12. NEs. CONST. art. XV, § 6.
13. NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 7. "Power purposes" are designated in section
7 as a "public use," which, unlike the three uses specified in section
6, are not to be alienated, but only leased or developed.
14. NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 46-209, 46-226 (Reissue 1974). Actually, the statutes
preceded the constitutional enactments, with the statutory sections
having been first passed by the 1919 legislature.
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responsibility for determining priorities, 15 the legislature instructed
the DWR: "All appropriations for water must be for some benefi-
cial or useful purpose, and when the appropriator or his successor
in interest ceases to use it for such purpose the right ceases."'16 The
legislature further requires that appropriators who wish to secure
priority rights to stream water apply to the DWR and stipulate,
inter alia, "the purpose for which water is to be applied."'17 But
again, nowhere in the statutes is it stated what purposes are "bene-
ficial uses" and therefore entitle the appropriators to a priority.
L.B. 149 attempts to make such a statement.
III. L.B. 149'S NEW DIMENSION
In the process of defining "beneficial use" as a non-exhaustive
list of purposes for which stream water may be appropriated, L.B.
149 appears to add a new dimension to that term as used in
Nebraska water law. Its original dimension was described by the
Nebraska Supreme Court: "While many elements must be consid-
ered in determining whether water has been put to beneficial use,
one is that it shall not exceed the least amount of water that ex-
perience indicates is necessary in the exercise of good husbandry
for the production of crops.' 8  From this limited definition of
"beneficial use," which is the only one in Nebraska law, it is clear
that the, court's focus was on stating a test for determining how
much water can be beneficially used,19 and not on what types of
uses may be considered beneficial. The emphasis on quantity has
not been uncommon in judicial discussion of beneficial use, and may
be responsible for the term's flexible and rather vague meaning.
20
15. Id.
16. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-229 (Reissue 1974).
17. NEB. REv. STAT. § 46-233 (2) (g) (Reissue 1974).
18. Enterprise Irr. Dist. v. Willis, 135 Neb. 827, 832, 284 N.W. 326, 329
(1939).
19. For a discussion of this original dimension of "beneficial use," see
Fischer, Harnsberger & Oeltjen, Rights to Nebraska Streamflows: An
Historical Overview With Recommendations, 52 NEB. L. REV. 313, 351
(1973).
20. The flexibility of the concept, as well as the emphasis on quantity,
is represented by the language of the California Supreme Court:
[I]t should be stated that, whatever quantity an appropriator
has actually diverted in the past, he gains no right thereto un-
less such water is actually put to a reasonable beneficial use.
... What is beneficial use, of course, depends upon the facts
and circumstances of each case. What may be a reasonable
beneficial use, where water is present in excess of all needs,
would not be a reasonable beneficial use in an area of great
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The focus of L.B. 149, however, appears to be on what types of
uses are capable of being beneficial, and therefore deserving of ap-
propriation priorities. If L.B. 149 is enacted, the term "beneficial
use" would thus have two dimensions in Nebraska law.
Although not defining "beneficial use, '21 the Nebraska constitu-
tion and statutes implicitly recognize as beneficial uses domestic,
agricultural, and manufacturing applications of waters of natural
streams.22 Also implied as a beneficial use is the application of
water to generation of power.23 Beyond this, however, little guid-
ance has been provided the DWR for determining what uses of
stream water are to be deemed beneficial and deserving of an ap-
propriation priority.24  The legislature has simply directed the
DWR to approve an appropriation priority application "[i] f there
is unappropriated water in the source of supply named in the ap-
scarcity and great need. What is a beneficial use at one time
may, because of changed conditions, become a waste of water
at a later time.
Tulare Irr. Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irr. Dist., 3 Cal. 2d 489, 567, 45
P.2d 972, 1007 (1935).
21. "Beneficial use" has almost never been defined by case or
statute. In 1971 Washington broke the tradition: "Uses of
water for domestic, stock watering, industrial, commercial,
agricultural, irrigation, hydroelectric power production, min-
ing, fish and wildlife maintenance and enhancement, recrea-
tional, and thermal power production purposes, and preserva-
tion of environmental and aesthetic values, and all other uses
compatible with the enjoyment of the public waters of the
state, are declared to be beneficial." Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
90.54.020 (1).
F. TRELEASE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON WATER LAW 49 (2d ed. 1974).
22. NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 6; NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-204 (Reissue 1974). The
implicit recognition of these three uses as beneficial may be found in
the constitutional and statutory ranking in preference of these uses
when water supply is short. If these uses are not beneficial, they
would be deserving of no preference.
23. NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 7; NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-236 (Reissue 1974).
24. In many states, while an explicit definition of "beneficial use" has
been lacking, the courts have found various uses entitled to appropria-
tions:
On the whole, in deciding appropriation questions, the
courts have held many different uses of water to be beneficial.
In the earlier court decisions, esthetic and recreational con-
siderations were no more acceptable as the basis of a valid
appropriation of water than as the basis of a riparian right.
•... In recent years, however, the importance of recreation
as a beneficial use of water has been recognized in some of
the statutes, and provision for recreational facilities has be-
come an important feature of large water project develop-
ments.
1 R. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 89-90 (1967) (footnotes
omitted).
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plication, and if such application and appropriation when perfected
is not otherwise detrimental to the public welfare."25 This rather
minimal requirement of nondetriment suggests the legislature has
not considered "beneficial use" a term of art, but rather a vague
standard for agency discretion. This suggestion is borne out in the
approach apparently taken by the DWR in executing its duties in
regard to appropriation of stream water. Appropriation priorities
have been granted for purposes besides the uses recognized in the
constitution and statutes (domestic, agricultural, manufacturing,
and power) .2 Of course, in some cases more definite categoriza-
tion would not be particularly helpful to either the DWR or the
prospective appropriator; some appropriations of water are put to
more than one beneficial use. A single dam project, for example,
may at the same time prevent flooding, conserve soil, supply water
for irrigation, and provide recreation and habitat for wildlife.
The inclusive list of beneficial uses recognized in L.B. 14927 and
the general provision of "any other purpose having public value,"
apparently would not require the DWR to cease granting appropria-
tion priorities to uses it has previously recognized. Nor would the
standard of nondetriment to public welfare be altered. To the con-
trary, the real issue of L.B. 149 may lie in how greatly it would
expand the categories of beneficial use for which appropriation
priorities may be obtained.
Clearly, L.B. 149 would remove most doubts about what is to
be deemed in law and by the DWR as beneficial uses of water, at
least in the second-dimensional sense of what uses are capable of
being beneficial. Especially, the bill would remove concern, if any
exists, that existing law can be construed to restrict the ranks of
beneficial uses to the four categories presently enumerated in the
constitution and statutes.2 8  But, for whatever it may settle, L.B.
149 gives rise to a significant uncertainty: Does the bill allow in-
stream appropriation of water?
25. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-235 (Reissue 1974).
26. In its most recent listing of existing appropriation priorities, the DWR
had among its approved uses "cooling," "steam," and "storage." DEPT.
OF WATER RESOURCES FoRTY-FIRST BIENNIAL REPORT TO THE GovERNOR OF
NEBRASKA 1975-76. Comparison with previous reports indicated "stor-
age" is a catch-all label for uses formerly designated separately rang-
ing from soil conservation to recreation.
27. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
28. See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
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IV. DIVERSION OR IN-STREAM APPROPRIATION
At common law, man-made diversion of water from its stream-
bed, in addition to an intention to apply the water to some
beneficial use and actual application within a reasonable time, has
been considered a necessary element for appropriation. 29 However,
some courts have held that the requirement of man-made diversion
is dispensable in a proper case.30 Such a proper case has been found
where nature is already doing the job that a diversion structure
would accomplish, by, for example, periodically flooding a river.
3 1
But, the courts have not on their own gone so far as to find a valid
appropriation where no diversion, either man-made or natural, has
occurred; that is, they have not recognized in-stream use of water
for recreation, navigation, fish and wildlife and so forth as a bene-
ficial use which allows an appropriation priority.
3 2
What the courts have not themselves done, however, the legisla-
tures of at least two states have. Colorado has enacted into law
two changes which allow in-stream appropriation of water. One
removes from the statutory definition of "appropriation" any refer-
ence to diversion: "'Appropriation' means the application of a cer-
tain portion of the waters of the state to beneficial use."133 The
other provides that the state may appropriate water to maintain
minimum stream flows. 34 A significant difference between these
29. As a general rule, to constitute a valid appropriation of water,
three elements must exist: (1) An intent to apply it to a ben-
eficial use, existing at the time or contemplated in the future;(2) a diversion from the natural channel by means of a ditch,
canal, or other structure; and (3) an application of it within
a reasonable time to some useful industry.
In re Rights to Use of Waters in Silvies River, 115 Or. 27, 64-65, 237
P. 332, 336 (1925). Accord, Walsh v. Wallace, 26 Nev. 299, 67 P. 914
(1902); Reynolds v. Miranda, 83 N.M. 443, 493 P.2d 409 (1972).
30. It is not necessary in every case for an appropriator of water
to construct ditches or artificial ways through which the water
might be taken from the stream in order that a valid appro-
priation be made. The only indispensable requirements are
that the appropriator intends to use the waters for a beneficial
purpose and actually applies them to that use.
Genoa v. Westfall, 141 Colo. 533, 547, 349 P.2d 370, 378 (1960).
31. In re Rights to Use of Waters in Silvies River, 115 Or. at 66, 237 P.
at 336.
32. Colorado River Water Conserv. Dist. v. Rocky Mountain Power Co.,
158 Colo. 331, 406 P.2d 798 (1965).
33. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(3) (1973) (emphasis added).
34. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (1973) provides:
"Beneficial use" is the use of that amount of water that is rea-
sonable and appropriate under reasonably efficient practices to
accomplish without waste the purpose for which the appropri-
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two Colorado statutes appears to be that while any otherwise quali-
fied person may undertake an in-stream appropriation of Colorado
water by applying (not diverting) it to a beneficial use, only the
state may appropriate for the sole purpose of maintaining minimum
stream flows for environmental preservation.
By a combination of statute and judicial construction, Idaho has
also achieved in-stream appropriation of water. In 1971, the Idaho
legislature directed the State Department of Parks to appropriate
for the state's citizens the waters of a canyon, for the purpose of
preserving its scenic beauty and recreational value, and declared
that purpose a beneficial use.35 The Idaho Supreme Court upheld
the statute, despite a constitutional reference to diversion,36 holding
that diversion of water is not necessary for a valid appropriative
right.3 7
Clearly, L.B. 149 as it now reads would not go as far in chang-
ing the law as did the Colorado statutes. In comparison, while it
could be argued that under L.B. 149 minimum stream flow is a
"purpose having public value, '38 and is therefore a beneficial use,
such an intent is far from evident in the Nebraska bill's language.
Also, no procedure comparable to that of the Colorado law39 is pro-
vided for securing minimum stream flow. Most importantly, L.B.
149 does not strike from the statutes explicit reference to diver-
sion,4 0 as was the case in Colorado. This factor casts considerable
doubt on the bill's ability to create in-stream appropriation of
water. The fact that L.B. 149 includes as beneficial uses such items
ation is lawfully made and, without limiting the generality of
the foregoing, includes the impoundment of water for recrea-
tional purposes, including fishery or wildlife. For the benefit
and enjoyment of present and future generations, "beneficial
use" shall also include the appropriation by the state of Colo-
rado in the manner prescribed by law of such minimum flows
between specific points or levels for and on natural streams
and lakes as are required to preserve the natural environment
to a reasonable degree.
35. IDAHO CODE § 67-4307 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
36. IDAHO CONsT. art. 15, § 3: "The right to divert and appropriate the
unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses, shall
never be denied. . . ." (Emphasis added).
37. State Dept. of Parks v. Idaho Dept. of Water Admin., 96 Idaho 440,
530 P.2d 924 (1974).
38. See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
39. Id. See note 34 supra.
40. "The right to divert unappropriated waters of every natural stream
for beneficial use shall never be denied ... ." NEB. REv. STAT. § 46-
204 (Reissue 1974) (emphasis added).
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as recreation, fish and wildlife and navigation 4' does not necessarily
overcome this third point, because each of these uses may be served
by lake and pond impoundments (which do have diversion struc-
tures). By this fact, the Nebraska court could easily read the in-
clusion of these items in L.B. 149 as referring to such impoundments
and not to in-stream appropriation. Finally, a similar reference to
diversion is to be found in the Nebraska constitution. 42
But, as was the case in Idaho, the constitutional and statutory
references to diversion are not necessarily dispositive of the issue
of whether L.B. 149 allows in-stream appropriation. For one thing,
the negative phraseology of the constitutional and statutory provi-
sions does not prohibit appropriation by "application" of water to
a beneficial use as well as by diversion of water to such a use. For
another, if L.B. 149 were enacted, it would become the legislature's
most recent and most specific pronouncement on water rights 43 and
thereby would be entitled to additional weight when construed with
the now-existing statutory references to diversion.
Since L.B. 149 is subject to amendment, and since, if it is not
enacted in the second session of the 85th Legislature, it may be
reintroduced as is or as modified in subsequent legislatures, it is
perhaps as important to gauge the intent of its supporters as it
is to analyze the bill's language. Testimony at the hearing indicated
that at least some of the proponents of L.B. 149 expect that the
bill would allow for in-stream appropriation 44 and/or minimum
41. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
42. "The right to divert unappropriated waters of every natural stream
for beneficial use shall never be denied except when such denial is
demanded by the public interest." NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 6 (emphasis
added).
43. These rules of statutory -construction were employed by the Idaho Su-
preme Court in State Dept. of Parks v. Idaho Dept. of Water Admin.,
96 Idaho 440, 530 P.2d 924 (1974).
44. Hearing on L.B. 149 Before the Comm. on Public Works, supra note
3, at 39 (exhibit H) (statement of Alice Hamilton for the League of
Women Voters of Nebraska):
The term "beneficial use" is not expressly defined in the
Statutes. However, the following uses are generally held to
be beneficial use: domestic, agricultural, manufacturing, in-
dustrial and power. All of these uses involve diverting water
from streams.
Water for recreation, fish and wildlife, ground water re-
charge and storage, waste assimilation and navigation are all
in-stream uses and not currently recognized as beneficial use.
And yet they benefit the general public.
We believe that this committee should give serious con-
sideration to L.B. 149 to further legislation which would aid





Judging by its current imprecise character in Nebraska law, the
concept of beneficial use would appear to benefit from the addi-
tional definition offered by L.B. 149.
For one thing, this definition would end any lingering uncer-
tainty in regard to the legal status of appropriations for purposes
other than domestic, agricultural, manufacturing or power.
But more importantly, this statutory definition would of neces-
sity focus legislative attention on making some choices among in-
creasingly competitive demands of various users of water. Without
some additional definition, choice among these demands may be
made, without benefit of public debate or legislative deliberation
and guidance, by the Department of Water Resources in a case-
to-case approach.
The interests at stake in L.B. 149's definition of beneficial use
become especially apparent when the possibility of in-stream ap-
propriation is considered. Surely at this late date the ranks of those
interested in in-stream uses, in quality of life and environment gen-
erally, are sufficient to secure to them the same opportunity to ap-
propriate water as that currently available to self-interested irriga-
tors and manufacturers.
However, if L.B. 149 is to be expected to carry the load of
45. Id. at 47-48 (closing statement of Senator Donald Dworak):
[T] his is not an attempt to prioritize water. We lose our flex-
ibility if we try and do that, and I don't think we want to
lose our flexibility, and I think a good illustration of that right
now is the lawsuit that has been filed against the REA by
the Nebraska Attorney General, and some of the things men-
tioned in this lawsuit as to why this particular project
shouldn't go ahead, and of course agriculture is listed. Irriga-
tion is listed. But also a minimum stream flows [sic], we're
talking about .... Domestic and agricultural is also men-
tioned. Certainly we talk in here about requiring the respon-
sible officially detailed statements, among other things, the en-
vironmental effects of such action .... We talk about fish
and wildlife. We talk about the Platte River refuge. These
are all items listed in this particular document .... Now in a
court case, if suddenly we were to say, "Well, this item right
here may be the factor that would have won this case in be-
half of the State of Nebraska," suddenly prioritized it No.
122nd on the list, in front of the federal court, I think would
weaken our case. So very definitely this bill does not try to
prioritize.
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instituting in-stream appropriation in Nebraska water law, it may
be advisable for its proponents to make some adjustments. Prime
among these would be an amendment substituting "apply" for
"divert" in the appropriation statutes. A similar change in the cor-
responding language of the state constitution may eventually prove
necessary, although its "public interest" proviso may make constitu-
tional amendment unnecessary.46 Finally, the most direct and cer-
tain modification would be to simply insert into L.B. 149, before
the references to recreation, fish and wildlife, and navigation, the
word "in-stream."
These changes and adoption of L.B. 149 would set the stage for
the next, and even more competitive, step in up-dating Nebraska's
appropriation law: Determining preferences among various bene-
ficial uses for times when water is in short supply. Without L.B.
149 as modified, or a similar bill, there is a danger that the
important uses of water which are in-stream will not be in the
preference debate.
T. Edward Icenogle '78
46. See note 42 supra.
